In this paper, we describe the design and implementation of an online feedback system. By employing a simple anonymous authentication mechanism, the developed system prevents Sybil attacks and maintains the anonymity of the evaluator even against an abusive authority that has access to the evaluation servers. The developed system is generic enough, user friendly and allows the administrator to change the evaluation form to fit the assessment of essentially any type of function or performance.
INTRODUCTION
Web-based feedback systems are widely used to provide assessment for wide varieties of functions. An example for such systems is the electronic course evaluation (questionnaire) which requires students to provide selected response answers to a series of questions in order to evaluate the instructor teaching effectiveness in a given course. A more challenging example appears in reputation systems which are widely used for the establishment of trust relationships in large online communities such as eBay and Amazon.
Currently, most implementations for online feedback systems do not ensure the evaluator's anonymity. For example, in most of the electronic course evaluation systems presently implemented by several universities, an abusive authority which has access to the evaluation server log files, can easily link each student with her evaluation. While this is unlikely to happen in the academic environment where ethics and morals are highly valued, one can easily imagine several other scenarios where this may not be the case. This lack of trust in achieving true anonymity and the fear of a retaliatory response may prevent evaluators from casting their true opinions and hence limits the effectives of the overall evaluation process.
On the other hand, allowing uncontrolled anonymous feedback (e.g., RateMyProfessor.com) opens the door to Sybil attacks where a malicious user may subvert the system by creating a large number of pseudonymous entities, and use them to gain a disproportionately large influence.
It should also be noted that, in some situations, the authority overseeing the evaluation process may not always be unbiased. For example, a large number of negative ratings for buyers or sellers on a given virtual market website (e.g., eBay) will certainly reduce the total number of transactions and consequently the profit gained by this website. Thus, a dishonest company may try to block some negative feedbacks in order to optimize its profit; at least in the short term.
Cryptographic protocols [14] provide several invaluable primitives that can be used to design systems with stringent anonymity requirements (e.g., e-voting [2, 9, 11, 14] , e-cash [1, 2, 6, 7, 8] , electronic coupons [3] , and Peer-to-Peer systems [4] ). In this paper, we present an implementation for a web-based feedback system using RSA blind signature scheme [10] . The proposed system is generic enough, user friendly and allows the administrator to change the evaluation form to fit the assessment of any type of function or performance. In particular, by employing a simple anonymous authentication mechanism, the developed system ensures that: (i) The evaluator's anonymity is protected even against an abusive passive authority that has access to the evaluator server (we assume that this authority can read log files but cannot change the software running on these server). (ii) Every registered user is allowed to cast her vote only once. (iii) By issuing evaluation receipts, the authority responsible for the evaluation process can be held accountable if it blocks any user feedback.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the RSA blind signature scheme is reviewed. In section 3, the main components of the developed system are described and its security properties are discussed. Finally, section 4 provides a brief conclusion.
RSA BLIND SIGNATURES
A blind signature scheme [9] is a form of digital signature in which the content of a message is blinded before it is signed. The resulting signature can be publicly verified against the original un-blinded message in the same manner of a regular digital signature. Blind signatures are typically employed in privacy-related protocols, such as digital cash and electronic voting, where the signer and message author are different parties.
Blind signatures can also be used to provide unlink ability, which prevents the signer from linking later the blinded message to un-blinded version that it may be called upon to verify. In this case, the signer's response is first "unblinded" prior to verification in such a way that the signature remains valid for the un-blinded message. This property makes blind signature useful in schemes where anonymity is required.
Blind signature schemes can be implemented using a number of common public key signing schemes. In what follows, we describe the RSA blind signature scheme. Suppose Bob wants Alice to sign a message m without knowing the content of m, then they have to follow these protocol steps:
(i) Bob randomly selects a random blinding factor and makes a blinding transformation on to get the blinded message as: ̀ . mod where re th key of Alice. , a e public signing (ii) Bob sends ̀ to Alice. Note that Alice will not be able to recover fro ̀ because she does not know the blinding fact m or . (iii) Alice signs ̀ using her private key to produce ̀ ̀ . . and then returns . ̀ to Bob (iv) To obtain Alice's signature on Bob computes ̀.
PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Roles of Participants
In general, participants in the evaluation process can be categorized depending on their roles in the evaluation process as: (i) Administrator: responsible for the creation, modification or deletion of users accounts. The administrator is also responsible for the creation of different evaluation form. (ii) Evaluator: a registered user that is allowed to perform the evaluation by filling and submitting the evaluation form to the evaluation server.
(iii) Evaluatee: the person whose qualifications and performance are being evaluated. An evaluatee may review the evaluation summary for any one of her evaluations. (iv) Reviewer: a person who is allowed to view a prespecified list of evaluations.
Our system has been implemented using Microsoft's Visual Studio .NET development environment. The server side is an ASP.NET 2.0 dynamic data drive web application written in C#.NET, which is embedded in the HTML pages. The client-side code has been implemented with HTML and JavaScript. The system utilizes the new membership capabilities of ASP.NET 2.0. In particular, it uses role-based security to control access to the website. 
Evaluation Server
It should be noted that, although the evaluation server and registration server are shown in Fig.1 as two separate blocks, they can be implemented on the same machine.
Before making any action, a user must be registered in the Registration Server (RS) by the Administrator (Admin). When an authenticated user (U) logs into the system, the configuration file (web.config) specifies what actions can be performed by U depending on her role. Once logged in, U will be taken to a webpage that dynamically presents the actions allowed by her role.
Fig.2. Protocol Messages exchange between E and RS. E RS
(1) Verify the authenticity of E. 
The Evaluation Procedure
After the Evaluator (E) successfully logs into the system and fills out the Evaluation Form (EF), then when E presses the submit button on the evaluation page the following procedures will be executed by the client software: It is important to note that, the last step in the process above should be performed after arbitrarily random interval (with a pre-specified time limit). This is necessary in order to prevent ES from revealing the identity of E by simply observing that E was the last entity communicating with RS before it receives . (1) Verify the validity of RS's signature in as: (2) Check nonreplication property, and then save the evaluation data in the database.
Fig.3. Protocol Messages exchange between E and ES.
The Verification Procedure
As shown in Fig.3 , when ES receives , EF and from it rms the fo verificati ss: E, perfo llowing on proce (i) Verify that where , is the public key of RS. If this verification fails, the submitted evaluation will be rejected.
(ii) Check if the evaluation database does not have any previous evaluation records with the same . If any previously received evaluations has the same , then the current evaluation will be rejected, otherwise it is saved in the evaluation database with its corresponding . This step is necessary to prevent any user from submitting the same feedback multiple times. The long length of ensures that the probability of having two clients generating the same is practically zero.
Security Analysis
In this section, we provide some informal argument that shows, by following the protocol above, our system satisfies its design goals. In the RS side, the submitted hash value of the evaluation form is blinded and hence RS cannot gain any information that it can be use later to link the contents of the evaluation form submitted by E. Moreover, it cannot link E to its un-blinded evaluation form. Also, only registered users are allowed to obtain RS blinded signature on their evaluations. By maintaining a simple record of users that have previously requested RS signature, no user will be allowed to perform this step more than once. By noting that the evaluation server accepts only evaluations that are signed by RS and the unregistered users cannot submit any feedback. Also the last verification step performed by ES ensures the registered users cannot submit their evaluation multiple times.
It should be noted that, the RS signs a blinded copy of the evaluation form and hence even if RS was biased, it cannot filter out any feedbacks based on its contents. The RS signature on the evaluation can be considered as evidence that can be used to challenge RS if the evaluation server refuses to accept/post the feedback of E.
CONCLUSION
We presented an online feedback evaluation system in which the evaluator's anonymity is ensured even against an abusive passive authority that has access to the evaluation server. Every registered user is allowed to cast her vote only once by issuing evaluation receipts. The authority is responsible for the evaluation process, and it can be held accountable if it blocks any user's feedback.
